Open letter criticises QES guidance and calls for changes to enable wider take-up

An industry coalition of e-signing platforms, qualified trust service providers (QTSPs) and UK-certified digital verification service (DVS) providers has called on the government and HM Land Registry to address what is says are errors in the drafting and implementation of guidance around Qualified Electronic Signatures (QES) that will “frustrate the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government’s (MHCLG) ambitions for QES and hinder economic growth in the conveyancing sector”.

The coalition points to the slow take up of QES in conveyancing transactions, despite them being eligible for use since August 2025. A freedom of information request in June identified QES had been used just five times by the end of the first quarter of this year.

The letter explains how wider adoption of QES is gathering pace in Europe with EU member states soon offering an EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) to all citizens enabling QES signatures – an outcome the letter says “reflects a clear policy objective of the European Commission: to make high-assurance digital identity and electronic signing capabilities widely available and interoperable across EU member states.”

The letter argues the adoption in England and Wales is hindered by requirements at HMLR that all parties must sign the same electronic document with QES, and that execution in counterpart is therefore prohibited. The inability to combine signatures, for example using QES, conveyancer-certified electronic signature (CCES), mercury and wet ink signatures, as part of a registrable disposition is also prohibited, making QES “impractical, particularly where one counterparty does not possess a biometric passport.” The letter warns that unless mixed‑format signing is enabled, the adoption of QES in England and Wales will remain stalled and will not achieve its potential to modernise and digitalise the conveyancing sector.

The letter also calls for the extension of HMLR’s Safe Harbour Scheme, whereby HMLR will not seek recourse from conveyancers who use identity providers which fulfil the requirements of Practice Guide 81 in the event of a fraudulent registration, to be extended to QES on the grounds that the identity proofing “meets or exceeds” the Safe Harbour standard.

Speaking to Today’s Conveyancer, the former general counsel of Docusign and expert in digital signature technology, Richard Oliphant, who has worked with the signatories to bring this to the attention of HMLR, explained: ”QES is increasingly mainstream. When member states rollout the EUDI Wallet later this year, QES will become the de facto standard for signing in the EU. If we don’t act now, we will be left trailing in their digital slipstream.

“QES is the best tool for combating AI-driven identity fraud which is now prevalent in the conveyancing sector. QES helps because it cryptographically binds the signatory’s verified identity to the signed document. HMLR clearly recognises the advantages of QES and the need for the sector to transition away from CCES and wet‑ink signatures. But the implementation has been badly mishandled – and the fact that only five remortgage deeds were signed with QES in Q1 is a pretty damning statistic. No amount of spin can change that.

“It’s been a bumpy start but I remain optimistic. If HMLR makes the changes proposed by the industry coalition’s letter, it will spur adoption of QES in the conveyancing sector and, I think, in the wider UK economy whenever a higher level of identity assurance is needed.”

The letter has been signed by organisations including Signicat, Thirdfort, Namirial, Yoti and Digidentity. It has also been circulated to HMLR, MHCLG, the Conveyancing Association and the Digital Property Market Steering Group.

Industry Coalition of E-Signing Platforms, DVS-Certified Identity Providers, EU Qualified Trust Service Providers and Subject Matter Experts

13 July 2026

Iain Banfield
Chief Land Registrar
Land Registry
PO Box 2079
Trafalgar House
1 Bedford Park
Croydon
CR0 2AQ

Remedying the flaws in HM Land Registry’s QES guidance

Dear Chief Land Registrar,

“We will work with the sector and facilitate uptake of digital ID, Qualified Electronic Signatures, and digital logbooks and packs.” – MHCLG Home Buying and Selling Reform Roadmap published on 9 June 2026 (MHCLG Roadmap).

We are an industry coalition of e-signing platforms, qualified trust service providers on the EU Trusted List (QTSPs),  DVS-certified identity providers and other stakeholders that are engaged in the delivery of Qualified Electronic Signature (QES)[1] services to conveyancers and their clients in England and Wales.

We welcome the decision in August 2025 by HM Land Registry (HMLR) to accept QES for effecting registrable dispositions. We are also heartened by the explicit commitment in the MHCLG Roadmap to facilitate the uptake of QES.

However, we are concerned that the guidance published in Notice 2 (given under rule 54C of the Land Registration Rules 2003) and supplemented by HMLR’s October 2025 blog and section 8 of Practice Guide 82 (QES guidance) imposes restrictions on usage of QES that are:

• legally questionable; and
• inconsistent with the approach to QES taken by Registers of Scotland.

Unless the QES guidance is amended, we believe it will frustrate the MHCLG’s ambitions for QES and hinder economic growth in the conveyancing sector.

1. The Case for QES

QES is the gold standard of electronic signature under the UK and EU eIDAS legislation (eIDAS). It provides substantially stronger identity assurance and document integrity than conveyancer-certified electronic signatures (CCES), Mercury signatures or wet-ink execution.

Unlike CCES, QES removes the requirement for witnessing and attestation[2], streamlining execution of electronic documents (and deeds) on commercial e-signing platforms. A QTSP verifies the signatory’s identity to the standard required by ETSI TS 119 461[3]. We contend that the standard for remote identity proofing and for preventing presentation and injection attacks under the ETSI TS exceeds HMLR’s own digital identity standard in practice guide 81 (PG 81) which is founded on principles set out in the government’s Good Practice Guide 45 (GPG 45).

The business and policy case for QES is compelling. AI-driven identity fraud is an escalating threat to the conveyancing sector. QES mitigates this risk by cryptographically binding the signatory’s verified identity to the signed document.

Looking ahead, every EU member state will soon offer citizens a EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) following updates to the EU eIDAS regime. Once onboarded to an EUDI Wallet, a natural person will be able to sign with QES. This outcome reflects a clear policy objective of the European Commission: to make high-assurance digital identity and electronic signing capabilities widely available and interoperable across EU member states.

QES is already embedded in several EU member states as a tool for signing legally binding transactions. The rollout of EUDI Wallets will accelerate QES adoption, enabling trusted digital transactions at scale across domestic and cross-border use cases, reducing friction and strengthening the EU’s economic competitiveness.

HMLR should ensure its digital policymaking keeps pace with this critical EU development, which heralds a decisive shift away from simple electronic signature to QES.

2. Why the current QES guidance is not fit for purpose

The QES guidance contains two prohibitions that we respectfully submit are legally unfounded and will impede the ability of conveyancers and lenders to adopt QES at scale:

(a) Prohibition on execution in counterpart

HMLR has stated that section 91 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (2002 Act) requires all parties to sign the same electronic document, and that execution in counterpart is therefore prohibited. We disagree for the following reasons.

• Statutory interpretation. Section 91 refers to “a document”. Section 6(c) of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that words in the singular include the plural unless a contrary intention appears. There is no contrary intention expressed in the 2002 Act or its explanatory notes. “A document” is therefore capable of meaning “documents”, and does not preclude execution in counterpart.
• Signature requirement. Section 91(3)(b) of the 2002 Act requires the document to bear “the electronic signature of each person by whom it purports to be authenticated.” This requirement is fully satisfied where counterparts are assembled into a composite document before submission to HMLR: all required signatures are present when the document reaches the register.
• HMLR’s stated rationale is contradictory. In the October 2025 blog, HMLR described counterpart execution as “putting a paper transaction into an electronic form, rather than truly digitalising the process.” We strongly disagree. Counterparts are a well-established feature of modern conveyancing across CCES, Mercury and wet-ink transactions, and their use has no bearing on whether a transaction is digital or analogue. We contend that permitting counterpart QES execution would, in fact, accelerate digitalisation by enabling fully remote signing with a high level of identity assurance – without imposing artificial constraints that have no basis in law.
• Registers of Scotland allows use of counterparts. The QES guidance published by Registers of Scotland expressly permits execution in counterpart. There is no principled reason why the legal or technical framework in England and Wales should lead to a different outcome.

(b) Prohibition on mixed-format signing

HMLR’s current position is that all parties to a registrable disposition must sign using QES: “mixed-format signing” – where some parties sign with QES and others use CCES, Mercury or wet ink signatures – is excluded. This prohibition is not only inconsistent with HMLR’s own practice guidance; it makes QES commercially unviable. A recent Freedom of Information response has revealed that just 5 transactions were completed with QES in Q1 2026. This is a damning statistic.

• Inconsistency with existing practice. Mixed-format signing is accepted by HMLR for CCES, Mercury and wet-ink transactions. Conveyancers routinely present documents executed by a combination of these methods, and HMLR accepts them without objection. There is no clear legal or policy justification for treating QES differently.
• Commercial reality. In any multi-party transaction it is common for different parties to sign using different methods. Lenders, borrowers, guarantors and developers may each have different signing preferences or technical capabilities. Requiring all parties to use QES as a precondition of registration will in many cases make QES impractical, particularly where one counterparty does not possess a biometric passport.[4] The prohibition on mixed-format signing will therefore substantially reduce the utility of QES in precisely the complex, high-value transactions where its identity assurance is most needed.
• Registers of Scotland allows it. Again, the QES guidance published by Registers of Scotland expressly permits mixed-format signing.

3. The Safe Harbour Gap

HMLR already operates a “safe harbour” for conveyancers that use identity providers to verify client identity in accordance with requirements set out in PG 81. These requirements are derived from the principles in GPG 45. When the safe harbour standard is met, HMLR treats the conveyancer’s duty to verify identity as discharged and will not pursue recourse claims arising from fraudulent registrations on the grounds that identity checks were inadequate. Conveyancers are therefore heavily incentivised to verify their client’s identity in accordance with the requirements of PG 81 and secure the safe harbour.

Many QTSPs implement remote identity proofing processes that meet or exceed the safe harbour standard: ETSI TS 119 461 requires a formally assessed, high‑assurance identity proofing framework with robust protection against presentation and injection attacks and other sophisticated fraud vectors – controls that go beyond the outcome‑based principles in GPG 45. Despite this, HMLR’s QES guidance does not currently provide any equivalent safe harbour for transactions executed using QES.[5]

We invite HMLR to confirm that where a registrable disposition is executed with QES, the conveyancer will benefit from the same safe harbour protection as is available for a PG 81-compliant identity check.

4. Our Proposed Changes

We respectfully request that HMLR amend Notice 2 and update its QES guidance to implement the following changes:

1. Permit execution in counterpart. Amend Notice 2 to confirm that a registrable disposition may be executed in counterpart. This is consistent with the Interpretation Act 1978 and with the approach taken by Registers of Scotland.
2. Permit mixed-format signing. Amend the QES guidance to confirm that a registrable disposition may be executed using a combination of QES and other signature methods accepted by HMLR (including CCES, Mercury and wet-ink signatures). This is consistent with HMLR’s existing practice for non-QES dispositions and with the approach taken by Registers of Scotland.
3. Extend the safe harbour to QES transactions. Update PG 81 to confirm that QES enabled by a QTSP on the EU Trusted List will attract the same safe harbour protection as is available for a PG 81-compliant identity check.
4. Engage with stakeholders. We welcome the opportunity to engage with HMLR and work through the technical, legal and operational implications of these changes. Our coalition has substantial practical expertise in QES implementation across multiple jurisdictions and is well placed to assist HMLR in modifying your QES guidance.

We note that the restrictions in the current QES guidance have already attracted significant criticism from conveyancers. No comparable barriers exist in any EU member state or in Scotland. The current position risks placing England and Wales at a disadvantage relative to other jurisdictions at precisely the moment when  – thanks to the imminent launch of the EUDI Wallet –  QES is becoming a mainstream tool for identity-assured document execution.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with you and to provide any further information that would assist HMLR in remedying the QES guidance.

Yours faithfully,

Richard Oliphant

On behalf of the parties listed in the Appendix

 Copied to:

• The Digital Property Market Steering Group
• Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
• Office for Digital Identities and Attributes
• The Conveyancing Association
• The Open Property Data Association

Footnotes

• [1] A QES is: an advanced electronic signature, created using a certified Qualified Signature Creation Device, and based on a Qualified Certificate issued by a QTSP (eIDAS, art 3(12)).  
• [2] It should be acknowledged that the witnessing and attestation formalities still apply to the general usage of QES under English law. HMLR is relying on section 91 of the Land Registration Act 2002 to dispense with witnessing and attestation of registrable dispositions when signed with QES.
• [3] Version 2.1.1 will be mandatory for EU QTSPs in 2027.
• [4] In most (though not all) cases, a signatory uses a biometric passport to register (enrol) for a qualified certificate. According to the most recent ONS Census (2021), only 86 per cent of people in the UK have a biometric passport.
• [5] Most QTSPs should automatically satisfy the safe harbour requirements if the individual uses a biometric passport. But some QTSPs are using different methods of identity verification which offer a high level of assurance but may not meet the prescriptive requirements for the safe harbour in PG 81.

Appendix