Searches, supplier panels and the question of consumer choice in conveyancing

In the debate over conditional selling by estate agents, are conveyancers throwing stones in glass houses? Daniel Hamilton-Charlton, CEO of Property Searches Direct, examines the process surrounding conveyancing searches.

There is an increasing conversation within conveyancing circles about conditional selling in estate agency practice, particularly where consumers are encouraged or required to use in-house or tied services.

However, a parallel issue appears to exist within conveyancing itself, one that perhaps deserves equal scrutiny: the extent to which consumers are genuinely able to exercise choice over the sourcing of their own conveyancing searches.

In practice, we are seeing a growing number of home movers who wish to purchase regulated, or official, property searches independently, only to be told by some conveyancers that they must instead use the firm’s own search provider or panel arrangement.

This raises a straightforward but important question:

If a regulated search is acceptable when procured by a law firm, why is it sometimes deemed unacceptable when selected directly by the client who is paying for it?

A regulated product, yet inconsistent acceptance

The searches in question are not bespoke or unregulated products. They are standardised, regulated conveyancing searches produced under established industry frameworks governed by the Search Code and Personal Search Code Compliance Board, intended to be relied upon by lenders, conveyancers, buyers, sellers and insurers alike.

In many cases, the same search provider supplies identical products to multiple conveyancing firms without issue. Indeed, those same searches are routinely accepted in transactions across the market without concern.

Yet we are increasingly encountering situations where a firm will reject a search simply because it has not been ordered through their nominated supplier or internal channel. This issue does not typically arise where externally sourced searches are part of high volume referral relationships or introducer arrangements.

This inconsistency is difficult to reconcile in practical terms. If a search meets the requirements of one conveyancing firm acting in accordance with lender expectations and professional obligations, it is not immediately clear why it should be treated as unsuitable purely based on procurement route.

Client choice versus supplier control

At the heart of this issue lies a broader tension between client choice and supplier control.

From the consumer’s perspective, the position is simple. The home mover is paying for the search, relying on it, and ultimately bearing the risk of delay or duplication if it is rejected. In many cases, they have already chosen a provider based on cost, efficiency, or familiarity.

From the conveyancer’s perspective, there may be commercial arrangements in place with preferred search suppliers, often linked to case management systems, volume commitments, or integrated technology solutions.

The difficulty arises where those commercial arrangements begin to determine, or appear to determine, whether a client’s independently sourced search is accepted.

Commercial arrangements and potential conflicts

It is well understood within the profession that search provision is not always a neutral procurement exercise. Many firms benefit from rebates, referral arrangements, or integrated technology packages linked to search volumes.

In some cases, technology platforms and workflow systems are provided in return for expected or committed search activity levels. Where those expectations are not met, commercial consequences may follow.

None of this is inherently improper. However, it does raise an important question of principle:

Are decisions being driven by objective risk management considerations, or by commercial arrangements that sit behind the scenes of search procurement?

The distinction matters, particularly in a regulated profession where firms are required to act in the client’s best interests and maintain clear transparency around conflicts and incentives.

The regulatory expectation

The profession is already subject to clear expectations under the Solicitors Regulation Authority framework and the principles embedded within the Law Society’s Conveyancing Protocol, both of which emphasise transparency, integrity, and acting in the client’s best interests.

Against that backdrop, any practice that restricts client choice should be capable of clear, objective justification, particularly where equivalent regulated products are readily available in the market.

Where a restriction exists purely because a firm operates a closed supplier model, or because commercial arrangements favour a particular provider, it is legitimate to question whether that aligns with the spirit, if not the letter, of those expectations.

A question of consistency

It is not suggested that firms should be compelled to accept every search from every provider without question. Quality control, risk management and lender compliance are all essential parts of the conveyancing process, and firms must satisfy themselves that suppliers meet appropriate standards.

However, where a regulated search is routinely accepted by multiple firms, and rejected by others without clear technical justification, the profession risks creating an inconsistent consumer experience that is increasingly difficult to justify.

At the very least, greater transparency would appear beneficial. If a search is rejected due to policy, that policy should be clearly articulated and justified. If acceptance depends on supplier relationships or integrated systems, that too should be capable of explanation.

This is not a question of undermining professional judgement. It is a question of ensuring that professional judgement is not inadvertently shaped by commercial structures that sit outside the client’s awareness.

If conveyancing is to maintain trust in an increasingly competitive and technology driven market, then consumer choice and transparency in search procurement may merit further reflection.

Because ultimately, the question is not about who supplies the search. It is about whose interests are being served in the decision to accept or reject it.

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